Is agglomeration taxable? by Jofre Monseny, Jordi
 IS AGGLOMERATION TAXABLE?   
Jordi Jofre-Monseny 
Document de treball de l’IEB 2010/15 
Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2010/15 
IS AGGLOMERATION TAXABLE? 
 
 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the public 
finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on applied 
research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research that is 
particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special consideration. 
Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of the program. The 
program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-UB Chair in Fiscal 
Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Caixa Catalunya, Abertis, La Caixa, Gas Natural 
and Applus) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2010/15 
 
IS AGGLOMERATION TAXABLE?* 
 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Several theoretical papers that examine tax competition with agglomeration 
effects have stressed the possibility that the governments of jurisdictions in which 
economic activity is concentrated may tax firms more heavily (taxable agglomeration 
rents). In this paper, we examine the tax rate setting decisions taken with regard to the 
Spanish municipal business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas). The analysis, 
carried out with a sample of 2,772 municipalities, focuses on the effect that urbanization 
economies, localization economies and the market potential of municipalities have on their 
business tax rates. High urbanization economies and high localization economies are found 
to increase the business tax rate. Although the evidence is weaker, the results also indicate 
that municipalities with better access to demand (of consumers) set higher tax rates. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: H3, H7, R  
Keywords:  Local taxes, agglomeration economies, tax competition. 
 
 
 
 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny 
Universitat de Barcelona & IEB 
Dpt. d’Economia Política i Hisenda Pública 
Avda. Diagonal 690, Torre 4, Planta 2ª 
08034 Barcelona (Spain) 
E-mail: jordi.jofre@ub.edu 
 
 
 
                                                 
* I acknowledge financial support from SEJ2007-65086, 2005SGR00285 and 2009SGR102. I thank Albert 
Solé-Ollé for helpful suggestions and guidance. I am also grateful to Marius Brülhart, Thiess Buettner, Robert 
Inman, Hyun-Ju Koh, Mario Jametti, Eva Mörk, Elisabet Viladecans and Dan Wilson for providing helpful 
comments. 
 1. Introduction 
Agglomeration economies can make certain jurisdictions much better places to run 
businesses than others. To be able to locate in an area that hosts an agglomeration of firms, 
companies are willing to pay higher rents and wages. When business taxation is 
decentralized, a higher tax bill is another cost firms may incur in exchange for being in such 
a location. The objective of this paper is to analyze whether governments of jurisdictions 
that host agglomerations of firms set higher taxes on their businesses. To this end, we 
study the tax rate determinants of a local business tax in Spain, the Impuesto sobre Actividades 
Económicas. 
 Kind et al (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003) and 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) were the first papers to introduce agglomeration effects in a 
tax competition model. All these papers use New Economic Geography (NEG) models, 
where firms exhibit increasing returns to scale and where transporting goods is costly. In 
order to save on transport costs, firms prefer to locate in the large market and export 
elsewhere. This agglomerative force is known in the literature as the market-access effect1. 
In these models, the market-access effect is stronger at intermediate trade costs2. Hence, it 
is at intermediate trade costs that these models produce a Core-Periphery outcome, where 
all firms locate in a single jurisdiction (the core). In a Core-Periphery outcome, the return 
of capital in the core is higher than at the periphery (should a firm move there), creating an 
agglomeration rent. The size of this agglomeration rent is determined by the strength of the 
market-access effect. Since this effect is stronger at intermediate trade costs, the 
agglomeration rent is hump-shaped with trade costs. In certain circumstances, the tax 
differential between the core and the periphery will follow the shape of the agglomeration 
rent and, therefore, agglomeration rents are said to be taxable (see Kind et al 2000; Ludema 
and Wooton, 2000; and Baldwin and Krugman, 2004)3. 
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) study tax competition in a NEG model that 
does not create agglomeration rents4, focusing on the case of ex-ante asymmetrical 
                                                 
1 In most NEG models there is a second agglomerative force known as the cost-of-living effect. 
For the sake of simplicity we do not discuss this effect here (see Baldwin et al (2003)). 
2 If trade costs are too low, geography does not play a role. If trade costs are too high, trade 
becomes prohibitive. 
3 In this set-up, trade integration (a reduction in trade costs) triggers a ‘race to the top’ at relatively 
high transport costs and a ‘race to the bottom’ once trade costs are relatively low. 
4 That is, the model does not show catastrophic agglomeration. The model these authors use is 
known as the linear footloose capital model. 
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 jurisdictions. In this model, the large jurisdiction in terms of consumers/population ends 
up hosting a more than proportionate share of capital, due to the market-access effect. 
These authors show that the jurisdiction with a higher market potential sets a higher capital 
tax rate5. This hypothesis is empirically tested in Charlot and Paty (2007). Their analysis, 
conducted using French municipal data, finds that municipalities with better access to 
demand set higher taxes on business activities, indicating that municipal French 
governments tax market potential. One concern when one aims to test predictions derived 
in a NEG model with municipal data is whether or not the market-access effect is a 
relevant agglomerative force at this spatial level. Fujita and Thisse (2002) point out that the 
market-access effect is probably responsible for the agglomeration of economic activities at 
a large geographical scale (e.g. “Manufacturing Belt” in the US or the “Blue Banana” in 
Europe)6. Charlot and Paty (2007) deal with this issue by specifying the market potential of 
a municipality to be its income plus a weighted sum of the income in the rest of French 
municipalities, assigning a higher weight to municipalities that are geographically closer. 
There are, however, other agglomeration effects which can yield a better match 
between the geographical scope of agglomeration economies and the tax setting 
jurisdiction (in this case, the municipality). Knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling and 
input sharing are three agglomeration theories that are thought to explain agglomeration at 
the city level (see e.g. Ellison et al, 2010). Knowledge spillovers must operate at a very small 
geographical scale if they are to work via face-to-face contacts. It is less obvious that input 
sharing or labor market pooling agglomeration effects should be so localized. All these 
agglomeration theories predict a positive relationship between productivity (or a related 
measure like profits, wages or rents) and the size of the local economy (Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2004))7. Hence, regardless of the precise agglomeration theory(ies) at work, it is 
possible to empirically assess the geographical scope of agglomeration economies. 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) use US firm birth data and regress zip code level firm births 
on (pre-determined) employment levels located at different concentric rings from the zip 
code. The estimated effects of pre-determined employment levels on firm births fall 
                                                 
5 An equivalent result is found by Borck and Pflüger (2006) in a NEG model featuring partial 
agglomeration. 
6 In an empirical study of the effect of the market potential on the location of Japanese FDI across 
European regions, Head and Mayer (2004) partition France in 8 regions and Spain in 5. 
7 This partly explains the difficulty in distinguishing each of these three agglomeration theories 
empirically. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) and Ellison et al (2010) are the only studies that we know 
of that have tried to empirically quantify the importance of each of these agglomeration theories. 
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 sharply after the first mile, suggesting that agglomeration economies have a very limited 
geographical scope. Van Soest et al (2006) found similar evidence for the Netherlands. For 
Spain, Viladecans-Marsal (2004) and Jofre-Monseny (2009) found that external effects 
operating between firms found in neighboring municipalities seem to be, at most, very 
small. A relevant feature of all these studies is that the regressions include fixed effects for 
some upper-tier aggregation of the geographical units of observation (e.g. metropolitan 
area fixed effects in Rosenthal and Strange (2003)). Notice that the metropolitan area fixed 
effects may be absorbing some of the agglomeration effects operating between the firms 
found in different zip codes within a metropolitan area. Nevertheless, the results found in 
these papers indicate that there are agglomeration effects that are geographically highly 
localized. This provides a rationale for using municipal data to study the effect of 
agglomeration economies on business tax rates. 
In order to shed light on the nature of the relationship between agglomeration 
economies and local tax rates, we augment the tax competition game set up by DePater and 
Myers (1994) with agglomeration effects. Due to these agglomeration effects, the 
jurisdiction that hosts the agglomeration of firms is employing capital owned by non-
residents. As a result, the government that hosts the agglomeration of firms taxes 
businesses more heavily, as a means of exporting taxes to non-resident capital owners. 
As in most empirical studies, we distinguish between agglomeration effects taking 
place between firms within one industry (localization economies) and those taking place 
between firms in different industries (urbanization economies). We proxy urbanization 
economies with the employment level in a municipality. In some industries, localization 
economies are especially strong, providing incentives for firms in these industries to cluster 
in certain specific locations. We use the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index to identify 
industries in which localization economies may be important. We use the term “cluster” to 
define the municipalities in which these geographically concentrated industries are found. 
The estimates measuring the effect that higher urbanization and localization economies 
have on the business tax will be biased if local (business) tax rates determine the location of 
economic activities. To circumvent this problem we use an instrumental variable approach. 
As instruments, we use urbanization and localization economies’ variables measured in 
1970, long before the decentralization of the local business tax in Spain in 1992.  
We have argued that the market-access effect may not be the most important 
source of agglomeration at the municipal level. Nevertheless, when the consumption of a 
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 good involves physical transportation, as is the case in certain services, some municipalities 
have access to a larger market of consumers than others. Hence, there may also be some 
rationale for testing whether municipalities with higher market potential set higher tax 
rates. 
 In this paper we examine the municipal tax rates set for the Spanish municipal 
business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas). The analysis carried out with a (cross-
section) sample of 2,772 municipalities in 2002 focuses on the effect that urbanization and 
localization economies have on this tax rate8. High urbanization economies and high 
localization economies are found to increase it; and although the evidence is weaker, the 
results also indicate that municipalities with better access to demand (of consumers) set 
higher tax rates.  
After this introduction, in section 2 we augment the tax competition game set up by 
DePater and Myers (1994) with agglomeration economies. Section 3 presents the empirical 
analysis. We describe the data and variables in section 3.1. In section 3.2 we explain the 
econometric specification used. In Section 3.3 we report and discuss the results. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework and testable hypothesis. 
The model: There is one metropolitan area comprised of two jurisdictions 
( 2 ,1=i ). Each jurisdiction has an endowment of iL  units of urban land, each unit being 
the property of one resident landlord. There is a fixed amount of entrepreneurial capital in 
the metropolitan area ( K ) which can be employed in any jurisdiction and is completely 
mobile, i.e. 21 KKK += . Each landlord in the metropolitan area owns an equal share of 
entrepreneurial capital, )/( 21 LLKk += . Land and entrepreneurial capital are employed to 
produce a homogeneous private good X whose price is normalized to one and can be 
traded at zero cost. X is produced with the following constant returns to scale production 
function ),( iii LKFA ⋅ , whose intensive form is )( iii kfAx ⋅=  and satisfies 0>′f  and 
0<′′f 9. iA  denotes the level of agglomeration economies of the jurisdiction and, given 
capital intensity constant across jurisdictions, it introduces local productivity differentials.  
                                                 
8 Related papers are Devereux et al (2007), Brülhart et al (2007) and Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé 
(2008) which empirically assess whether or not agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity of 
firm location to local taxes. Carslen et al (2005) study whether (Norwegian) municipalities whose 
tax base is made up of relatively mobile industries set higher tax rates. 
9 Krogstrup (2008) analyzes the case where f’’>0, which produces a Core-Periphery outcome. 
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 The mobility of capital implies that its return ( ir ) has to be equal across 
jurisdictions: 
21 rr =              (1) 
where )( iii kfAr ′⋅=  is the competitive return of entrepreneurial capital. In turn, the 
competitive rent for land is iiiiii kkfAkfAR ⋅′⋅−⋅= )()( . We assume throughout the 
paper that 21 AA > . Notice that 21 AA >  implies that )()( 21 kfkf ′<′ , so as to make (1) 
hold, implying that 21 kk > . Hence, the jurisdiction with higher agglomeration economies 
ends up with higher capital intensity. This is reminiscent of the ‘home market effect’ in 
NEG models. 
Tax competition:. The government can use a source-based capital tax ( it ) to raise 
revenue ( iZ ) and provide local public services, iii LZz /= . Landlords’ utility depends on 
the consumption of the private good and local public services according to the following 
well-behaved utility function, ),( ii zxU . Capital mobility ensures that the after-tax return of 
capital ( ρ ) is equal across jurisdictions: 
2211 trtrρ −=−=             (2) 
The government can use a second tax instrument: a tax on land )( Lit . Each 
landlord finances its private good consumption with the rent of its property, iR , the net 
return of its capital assets, kρ , minus the tax on land, Lit , i.e. 
L
iiiiiii tkρkkfAkfAx −+′−= )()( . In turn, the government budget constraint becomes 
ii
L
ii kttz += . The government’s problem is to choose capital and land tax rates to 
maximize landlords’ utility, ),( ii zxU . The tax rates at the Nash equilibrium satisfy: 
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Note that the land tax is non-distortionary since its supply is completely inelastic and it 
does not affect the location of capital or its return (i.e. 0/ =Lii dtdk  and 0=Lidtρd / ). 
Hence the third and fourth terms in (3) vanish. Thus, expression (3) implies izix UU = , 
indicating that local public services are optimally provided. Plugging izix UU =  in 
expression (4) yields: 
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If the capital intensity is higher than the capital endowment, 0)( <− ikk , the jurisdiction 
taxes capital ( 0>it ). Conversely, if the capital intensity is lower than the capital 
endowment, 0)( >− ikk , the jurisdiction subsidizes capital ( 0<it ). The capital importing 
jurisdiction, 0)( <− ikk , taxes capital because this lowers the net return of capital and, 
thus, reduces the value of its imports. Conversely, the tax exporting jurisdiction subsidizes 
capital because this increases the value of its exports. Hence, each jurisdiction has an 
incentive to alter the terms-of-trade in its favor. Notice that the capital importing 
jurisdiction exports part of the capital tax burden to the capital exporting jurisdiction, in 
the form of a lower return to capital, ρ . The capital exporting jurisdiction also has the 
incentive to export taxes by decreasing the net return to capital. However, lowering the net 
return of capital only pays off if the jurisdiction is a net capital importer. 
We have seen that the capital importing jurisdiction will set a higher tax rate than 
the capital exporting jurisdiction. This result, first obtained by DePater and Myers (1994), is 
well known in the literature. We now show that under tax competition, jurisdiction 1 (with 
high agglomeration economies) will import and tax capital whereas jurisdiction 2 (with low 
agglomeration economies) will export and subsidize capital. To see why this is the case, 
assume that jurisdiction 2 wants to become a capital importer. This is only possible if 
0)( 21 >− tt  such that 12 kk >  in equilibrium (if 021 =− tt  then jurisdiction 2 exports 
capital because 21 AA >  implies 21 kk > ). However, being a capital importing jurisdiction 
implies taxing capital more than the capital exporting jurisdiction, as (5) shows, implying 
that 0)( 12 >− tt  which contradicts 0)( 21 >− tt . Hence, jurisdiction 2 cannot import 
capital. This leads to the main testable prediction of the paper, namely, that jurisdictions 
with high agglomeration economies set higher capital tax rates. 
So far, agglomeration economies have been considered to be exogenously 
determined. One way to make agglomeration economies endogenous is to write Ai as a 
function of capital (the mobile factor) in the jurisdiction, i.e. )( ii KAA = 10. In the annex, 
we study the case in which γii KKAA == )( , where γ  is a positive constant. In this 
particular example, making agglomeration economies endogenous does not alter the 
empirical prediction of the model, namely, a positive statistical association between 
                                                 
10 Notice that localization and urbanization economies are conceptually equivalent in this model 
since there is only one sector. 
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 agglomeration economies and the capital tax rate. This result also arises in Burbidge and 
Cuff (2005) and Wrede (2009) who study tax competition in models with increasing returns 
to scale. Like Burbidge and Cuff (2005) and Wrede (2009), we consider agglomeration 
effects to be external to the firm level. This modeling strategy is most adequate if one 
assumes that knowledge spillovers are the agglomeration mechanism at work (Fujita and 
Thisse, 2002). However, this model can also be interpreted as a reduced form version of a 
fully-fledged model with micro foundations (Krogstrup, 2008).  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Data and variables 
Data: The empirical analysis is carried out with a cross-section of Spanish 
municipalities. The agglomeration economies’ variables are constructed using data drawn 
from the Census of Establishments 2001 (Censo de Locales del INE). This database contains 
information on employment at the industry-municipality level. The agglomeration 
economies’ variables, along with a number of control variables also measured in 2001, are 
used to explain differences in the local business tax rates across municipalities in 2002. In 
Table 1 we describe the variables. Some of the control variables are not available for the 
smallest municipalities (those with a population below 1 thousand inhabitants). 
Nevertheless, we are able to gather a sample of 2,772 municipalities. All municipalities 
from the Basque Country and Navarra are excluded because, for historical reasons, these 
two regions have their own tax regimes. Our sample of 2,772 municipalities contains 95% 
of the Spanish population that do not reside in the Basque County or in Navarra. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Local taxes: The size of Spanish municipal governments is moderate, with municipal 
budgets representing 15% of total public spending. Inter-governmental grants represent a 
third of local budgets, local taxes represent another third, and the rest is made up by user 
charges. The business sector is charged a number of municipal taxes and fees. This list 
includes a local business tax, a property tax, a tax on vehicles, a tax on building activities, 
and a tax on the sale of land and buildings. Although the property tax (Impuesto sobre la 
propiedad inmueble) comes first in terms of tax revenue, the local business tax (Impuesto sobre 
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 Actividades Económicas) is the main local tax burden borne by the business sector (see Jofre-
Monseny and Solé-Ollé, 2009)11.  
The tax base of the local business tax is determined by national tax laws according 
to input usages (surface area, electricity usage, number of workers) and the economic 
sector of the firm. In principle, the tax base of each firm represents a proportion of its 
profits. This tax base is then multiplied by a municipal-specific augmentative coefficient, 
iτ , which applies to all establishments in each municipality regardless of economic sector. 
We refer to this municipal coefficient as the municipal business tax rate although, strictly 
speaking, it is not a ‘rate’. Note that two identical firms located in different municipalities 
pay a different share of their profits. In 2002, the tax revenue raised by the local business 
was 5 percent of the corporate income tax revenue. Since the effective tax rate of the 
corporate tax was around 24% in those years the local business tax revenue represented 
about 1.2% of the firms’ profits. This figure, however, underestimates the quantitative 
importance of the tax in the preceding years: in 1999, the local business tax revenue 
represented about 2.4% of the firms’ profits and the figure had been as high as 3.4% in 
1995. The reason is that the corporate tax revenue grew substantially during the economic 
expansion between 1995 and 2002, whereas the local business tax revenue remained 
relatively stable. This is due to the fact that the local business tax is a presumption tax, 
with a tax base computed from simple indicators of economic activity, meaning that this 
tax is less volatile than corporate tax. 
Municipal governments are given considerable tax autonomy in setting the municipal 
augmentative coefficients, which can vary from 0.8 to 1.9. However, the range within 
which municipalities can set their tax rate varies with population size. The maximum tax 
rate increases from 1.4 (<5,000 inhabitants) to 1.6 (5,001-20,000 inhabitants), to 1.7 
(20,001-50,000 inhabitants), to 1.8 (50,001-100,000 inhabitants) and to 1.9 (>100,000 
inhabitants). The minimum tax rate is 0.8 for all municipalities. In Figure 1 we plot the 
local business tax rate against population for all municipalities whose population exceeded 
1,000 inhabitants in 1999. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
11 The effect of the Spanish local business tax on the location of economic activity is addressed in 
Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003) and Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2009) and Jofre-
Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2008). 
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 Note that the variation in statutory tax rates is considerable. Note also that the number of 
municipalities that set a tax rate equal to the maximum permitted by law is far from 
negligible (20%). For most municipalities with binding maximum tax rates, the decision to 
change tax rates is obviously a constrained one. Hence, maximum tax rates are very likely 
to influence tax rate choices. For non-binding municipalities, maximum tax rates can partly 
determine tax setting behavior as well. For instance, municipal governments may be 
reluctant to choose the maximum tax rate level, or one that is too close to it, since this 
leaves them with no room for maneuver in the case of future budget difficulties. Therefore, 
differences in maximum tax rates need to be considered as a determinant of the tax rate.  
Agglomeration economies: Urbanization economies refer to agglomeration effects 
operating between firms outside the industry. They can be understood as the advantages 
that firms obtain from city size and are generally measured by the total amount of 
economic activity (firms or employees) in a given locale (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). 
Hence, our measure of agglomeration economies is simply the employment level of 
municipality i, )ln( ii employmentonurbanizati = . 
In some industries, agglomeration economies are especially strong between firms 
within the industry (localization economies). As a result, firms in these industries tend to 
locate in a few locales creating highly specialized economic environments or clusters. We 
first identify the industries in which localization economies are particularly strong by 
computing a variant of the Ellison and Glaser (1997) index. This index measures the 
geographical concentration of an industry ‘controlling’ for: 1) the geographical distribution 
of the overall economic activity and 2) the fact that employment in one industry may be 
concentrated in a few plants. Here we use not the original index but a variant developed by 
Guimarães et al. (2007) which can be computed with data on plant-counts by industry and 
municipality. These authors show that the plant-count data and the original version of the 
index yield the same expected value. Besides, the variance of the index is smaller using the 
plant-count data version. We compute this estimator using data from all continental 
Spanish municipalities for the year 200212. Notice that measuring industry concentration at 
the municipal level is important in order to identify the industries in which the geographical 
scope of their agglomeration effects matches Spanish municipalities. We consider that 
localization economies are relevant within an industry if the estimated Ellison-Glaeser 
                                                 
12 We use Social Security Register data since the Census of Establishments 2001 contains 
employment but not plant counts at the industry-municipality level. 
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 index is above 0.02 in that industry13. This yields six (2 digit) industries: Manufacture of textiles 
(CNAE 17), manufacture of leather and leather products (CNAE 19), publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media (CNAE 22), manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (CNAE 
26)14, manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (CNAE 34) and manufacture of other 
transport equipment (CNAE 35). This set of industries conforms to the a priori expectations 
with respect to the industries that create specialized economic environments in Spain15. 
As we mentioned above, this set of industries in which intra-industry agglomeration 
economies are especially strong is concentrated in a small number of locations. In order to 
identify the municipalities that host these industries, we define the variable cluster. We 
consider that there is a cluster in municipality i if it hosts a minimum share of the nation-
wide industry employment in any of the geographically concentrated industries defined 
above. In our baseline regressions, we specify this minimum share to be 1%. In Table 2, we 
report the number and size of clusters that result from specifying different minimum shares 
(0.1%, 0.5%, 1% and 5%)16. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
As regards the measurement of the market potential of a municipality, one could take 
its total income (population times the average income in the municipality). A positive 
statistical effect of this variable on the business tax rate would be consistent with the view 
that governments with better market-access set higher tax rates. However, income may be a 
determinant of the demand of local public services (and the business tax rate, as a 
consequence) if higher income is associated with a higher (or lower) preference for 
spending. Similarly, population can also determine spending (and the business tax rate, as a 
consequence) if there are economies of scale in providing local public services. Hence, our 
view is that it is problematic to identify the market potential effect using the income and 
population levels of the municipality. Note, however, that people can move across nearby 
jurisdictions to consume certain services. Hence, a municipality surrounded by populous 
and wealthy municipalities may have a better market potential than another municipality 
                                                 
13 An industry whose Ellison-Glaeser index is below 0.02 can be considered as showing little or no 
geographical concentration (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997). 
14 This industry includes the ceramics, glass and stone industries. 
15 We do not consider activities whose geographical concentration is obviously reflecting an uneven 
distribution of natural resources such as mining activities. Nor do we consider some geographically 
concentrated services such as the financial services. The reason is that these services are 
disproportionately located in a few very large cities, making the separate identification of 
localization and urbanization economies empirically difficult. 
16 In the results section we provide results for these different minimum shares. 
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 surrounded by poor and small municipalities. Hence, we propose the following market 
potential measure: 
)ln( lll ili incomepopulationwpotentialmarket ⋅⋅= ∑           (8) 
where wil is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if municipalities i and l 
belong to the same local labor market (and li ≠ )17. Hence, the measure we use for market 
potential exploits the location of each municipality but does not make use of its own 
market potential18. 
Control variables: In the stylized model of section 2, the business tax rate only 
depends on the agglomeration economies of the jurisdiction. The existence of a lump sum 
tax (the tax on land) ensures that the local public services are optimally provided (recall 
igix UU = ). Hence, any variable determining the optimal level of local public services 
provision affects the tax rate on land but not the tax rate on capital. Note, however, that 
this is a very stylized model. Therefore, in the empirical analysis we include a 
comprehensive set of control variables to capture potential differences in the desired level 
of local public services and the tax rate, as a consequence. 
Income changes the intensity with which citizens value local public services. For this 
reason, we include a proxy for the average income level of a municipality. As we have 
already pointed out, higher income can also reflect a higher (or lower) preference for public 
goods. We include a dummy variable that reflects whether the mayor belongs to a left-wing 
party, given that left-wing governments generally tax (spend) more19. We also include 
variables that capture special expenditure needs such as the share of population below 14 
years old, the share of population above 65 years old, the share of unemployed and the 
share of immigrants. We also include the share of population that live in disseminated 
nuclei of population, as this has been recognized as a relevant cost factor in the Spanish 
case (Solé-Ollé and Hortas-Rico, 2010). Population size has also been found to be an 
important determinant of the cost of providing local public services. We introduce 5 
dummy variables reflecting different groups of municipalities in terms of size which 
correspond to the size intervals defined by the Spanish tax law in relation to maximum tax 
rates. We do so for three reasons: 1) Spanish tax law also determines different expenditure 
                                                 
17 The local labor markets that we use have been computed by Boix and Galletto (2009). Rafel Boix 
kindly provided us with these data.  
18 Note, however, that in the regressions we will control for differences in income and population 
across municipalities. 
19 The political determinants of municipal tax rates in Spain are analyzed in Solé-Ollé (2003). 
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 responsibilities according to these size intervals. 2) Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) have found 
that the relationship between the cost of providing public services and population size is u-
shaped, and therefore, a flexible functional form may be preferable. 3) By including this set 
of dummy variables we control for the direct effect of maximum tax rates on tax rate 
setting behavior. In all regressions, we also include provincial dummies (European NUTS 3 
classification) to control for differences across regions in factors such as ideology or 
remoteness.  
The level of current grants received by the municipality can also change the intensity 
with which citizens value local public services and, hence, determine tax rates. In Spain, 
current grants to municipalities are formula-based and are (virtually) fully distributed on a 
population basis. The formula establishes different per capita amounts for different 
population size intervals. These coincide with the population size intervals defined by the 
Spanish tax law in relation to maximum tax rates. Hence, the effect of current grants on tax 
rates is absorbed by the population size dummies. 
3.2. Econometric specification 
We explained in Section 3.1 that municipal tax rates have legal limits that vary with 
population discretely. This implies that the tax rate setting decision has a constraint and, as 
we have seen, this constraint is binding for approximately 20% of our sample. We will use 
the Tobit model to deal with the fact that optimal and observed tax rates may differ for 
20% of our municipalities. In this application, different municipalities have different 
maximum tax rates. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), in a linear model with 
additive error term, this can be dealt with using the following simple normalization. We re-
define our dependent variable to be MAXii ττ −  (a negative variable constrained at zero for 
all municipalities) and estimate a standard Tobit model introducing a set of dummies (one 
for each group of municipalities facing the same maximum tax rate). 
 
3.3. Results 
Tobit results: In Table 3 we report the baseline Tobit results. We start with a relatively 
parsimonious specification in which the local business tax rate is regressed on the 
agglomeration economies’ variables and provincial and population size interval dummies. 
The results are shown in the first column. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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 Municipalities with higher employment (higher urbanization economies) are more 
likely to set higher tax rates. In particular, the results imply that a 10 per cent increase in the 
employment level of municipality i increases its tax rate by 1.3 standard deviations. 
Municipalities that host a cluster also set higher tax rates. Hosting a cluster is associated 
with a 1.34 standard deviation increase in the local business tax rate, ceteris paribus. Hence, 
these results are consistent with the hypothesis that urbanization and localization 
economies are taxable. Municipalities with relatively wealthy and populous neighboring 
municipalities (higher market potential) are also found to set higher tax rates, suggesting 
that municipalities with better access to demand set higher local business tax rates. 
However, this effect is economically very small. A 10 per cent increase in the market 
potential of a municipality only increases the local business tax rate in 0.12 standard 
deviations. Notice that the market potential variable is based on the population (and their 
income) found in neighboring municipalities. Hence, the comparison of this effect with 
those of the urbanization and cluster variables should be performed with caution.  
 In the second column of Table 3, we perform the same exercise but include the rest 
of control variables (income, left-wing government, share of population aged 0-14, share of 
population aged 65 or more, share of unemployed, share of immigrants and the share of 
disseminated population). The inclusion of these controls leaves the estimates of the 
agglomeration economies’ variables virtually unchanged. Left-wing governments set higher 
tax rates, either because if elected, they implement high tax (spending) policies or because 
in municipalities in which voters prefer high tax (spending) policies, left-wing governments 
are elected. A higher unemployment rate is associated with a higher local business tax rate. 
The rest of control variables (income, share of population aged 0-14, share of population 
over 65, share of immigrants and the share of disseminated population) do not seem to be 
relevant determinants of the business tax rate choice.  
For the sake of completeness, we report OLS results for the specification that 
includes all the control variables in the third column of Table 3. In this particular analysis, 
the Tobit and OLS results are remarkably similar. 
Instruments: There is evidence that local tax differentials can determine the 
location of economic activities20. The effect of the Spanish local business tax on the 
location of economic activity is analyzed in Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003), Jofre-
                                                 
20 Among the papers that show the effect of tax differentials on the location of economic activities 
Hines (1996) may be the most convincing one. 
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 Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2009) and Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2008). The results 
indicate that high local taxes deter local economic activities, implying that Tobit (OLS) 
estimates of the agglomeration economies’ measures on the local business tax rate may 
suffer from a simultaneity bias. We propose to instrument the agglomeration economies’ 
variables in 2001 with industry-municipality employment data from the 1970 Census of 
Establishments (Censo de Locales del INE, 1970)21. This approach is particularly appealing in 
this application because we can measure the agglomeration economies’ variables prior to 
the decentralization of local business taxation in Spain. The local business tax that we 
analyze (Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas) replaced an earlier local tax on business 
activities (Licencias fiscales de actividades comerciales e industriales y de actividades profesionales y de 
artistas). This reform was passed in 1988 although it was not fully implemented until 1992. 
The reform increased the importance of local business taxation in terms of local tax 
revenue which increased in real terms by 25% from 1991 to 1992. More importantly, the 
reform introduced tax power for the municipalities which could, within the described 
limits, set their own tax rate. 
We instrument the employment level in 2001, our measure of urbanization 
economies, with its lagged value in 1970. The binary variable cluster in 2001 is 
instrumented with the 1970 employment levels in the six industries considered to form 
clusters (see Table 2). There are two assumptions that the urbanization and localization 
economies’ variables in 1970 must satisfy in order to be appropriate instruments. First, they 
must determine the urbanization and cluster variables in 2001 (the instruments are 
relevant). This assumption can be based on the observation that agglomeration economies 
drive new firms to locations with many (old) firms (see e.g. Rosenthal and Strange, 2003)22. 
This is, however, a testable hypothesis, and we test it below. Second, the instruments must 
be valid. The maintained assumption is that no unobserved tax rate determinant determines 
the urbanization and localization economies’ variables in 1970. We deem this assumption 
plausible given that we measure the agglomeration economies’ variables long before 
municipalities could set different tax rates.  
                                                 
21 Instrumenting the variable of interest with its lagged value measured far apart in time is not new 
in the economics literature (see e.g. Ciccone and Hall, 1996)). 
22 Dumais et al (2002) find that new firms tend to locate in areas with more employment/firms. 
However, they find that a 1% increase in employment leads to less than a 1% subsequent increase 
in new firm creation, contributing to generate a certain mobility in the geographical location of 
industries. 
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 Instrumental variables (Tobit) results: In Table 4 we re-estimate the specifications 
reported in table 3, instrumenting the urbanization and cluster variables in 2001. In the first 
column, we report the results of a regression of the business tax rate on the agglomeration 
economies’ variables and provincial and population size interval dummies, using the Smith 
and Blundell (1986) Two Step Tobit estimator. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results obtained from this specification are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained when we did not instrument (first column in Table 3), i.e. municipalities with a 
high employment level and municipalities that host a cluster set higher local business tax 
rates. However, the estimated effects are larger. A 5% increase in the employment level of a 
municipality increases its business tax rate by 1.12 standard deviations (almost twice the 
effect obtained when we did not instrument). Likewise, the results imply that a municipality 
that hosts a cluster sets a business tax rate that is 0.7 standard deviations higher (almost 
three times the effect obtained when we did not instrument). These results are consistent 
with the view that high tax rates generate losses of economic activity. In the second column 
in Table 4, we introduce the rest of control variables (income, left-wing government, share 
of population aged 0-14, share of population aged 65 years old or more, share of 
unemployed, share of immigrants and the share of disseminated population). The results 
with and without these control variables are very similar, as was the case with the Tobit 
model estimates (see Table 3). In the third column, we report the results that we obtain 
using the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator instead of the Two-Step Tobit estimator. The 
results closely resemble those in column 2, indicating that the use of a particular estimation 
technique (Two-Step Tobit vs. 2SLS) makes no difference in this case. 
As we mentioned above, the instruments we construct from industry-municipality 
employment data in 1970 should determine the urbanization and cluster variables in 2001. 
This is a testable hypothesis. The F-test and the partial R-Squared, two first stage statistics, 
are 103 and 0.30 for the urbanization equation and 15 and 0.32 for the cluster equation, 
suggesting that the instruments used are relevant. Notice, however, that these statistics can 
not formally test the hypothesis that the model is identified, since there is more than one 
variable to instrument. We, therefore, complement these statistics with the Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic which rejects the null hypothesis that the model is not identified23. 
                                                 
23 This statistic was produced by the Stata unofficial command ivreg2. 
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 Robustness checks: As a first robustness check, we explore the extent to which the 
results we obtain are robust to the definition of the cluster variable. In the above analysis, 
we considered that a municipality hosts a cluster if its employment level in any of the 
industries defined in table 2 exceeds 1% of the nation-wide employment in the industry. In 
table 5 we report the results obtained when clusters are defined as municipalities hosting a 
minimum of 0.1, 0.5, 1 and 5% of the nation-wide industry employment. The numbers of 
clusters in each industry for each of these alternative thresholds are shown in Table 2. 
Notice that the results reported in the second column in table 4 (the baseline Two-step 
Tobit estimates) are identical to those in the third column in Table 5. These are maintained 
to aid comparability. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As expected, the results of these different specifications are very similar, except for 
the estimate of the cluster variable. Using the 0.1% threshold, the cluster variable estimate 
is smaller in size (0.094) and not significantly different from zero. For the rest of the 
threshold values (0.5%, 1% and 5%) the point estimate changes little (0.225, 0.176 and 
0.199) although the latter estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. Overall, the results seem robust to the definition of the cluster variable, 
once the specified threshold (the minimum share of the nation-wide employment) is above 
a critical value (in this case 0.1%). 
The relevant localization and urbanization economies of jurisdiction i may not be 
restricted to the level and characteristics of employment in municipality i. That is, firms in 
municipality i can also benefit from the presence of firms found in neighboring 
municipalities. After all, like consumers, employers/employees can also move across nearby 
municipalities. As we have mentioned, some papers have found that the geographical scope 
of agglomeration economies is highly localized. For Spain, Viladecans-Marsal (2004) and 
Jofre-Monseny (2009) find little evidence that agglomeration effects spill over municipal 
boundaries. In the light of these results, the effect of the spatial lag of the urbanization and 
cluster variables on the business tax rate should be positive (yet very small) or zero. 
However, a negative effect of the spatial lag of the urbanization and cluster variables on the 
business tax rate is also conceivable: this would be the case if municipalities that are 
geographically closer compete more intensely for firms24. In this case, the agglomeration 
                                                 
24 This hypothesis has found some empirical support for the Spanish case in Jofre-Monseny and 
Solé-Ollé (2009). 
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 economies of one municipality could be undermined by higher agglomeration economies in 
neighboring jurisdictions.  
In order to construct spatial lags of the urbanization and cluster variables, we 
consider that two municipalities are neighbors if they belong to the same local labor 
market, as we did when we defined the market potential variable. The variable measuring 
the urbanization economies of the neighboring municipalities is the log of the number of 
employees found in the rest of municipalities within the local labor market. Likewise, the 
cluster variable of neighbors takes the value of one if another municipality within the local 
labor market hosts a cluster. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The first column in Table 6 reports the (Tobit) estimates of a specification in which 
the business tax rate is regressed on the agglomeration economies’ variables (including their 
spatial lags) and provincial and population size interval dummies. In the second column, 
the rest of control variables (income, left government, share of population aged 0-14, share 
of population over 65, share of unemployed, share of immigrants and the share of 
disseminated population) is also included. Finally, we re-estimate this specification using 
the Smith and Blundell (1986) Two-Step Tobit estimator, where the urbanization and 
cluster variables and their spatial lags are instrumented. The results of this last specification, 
reported in the third column, indicate that municipalities whose neighbors host higher 
levels of employment do not set higher tax rates. In contrast, a municipality located in a 
local labor market in which another municipality hosts a cluster sets a tax rate that is 0.24 
standard deviations higher, ceteris paribus. Notice, however, that the presence of a cluster 
nearby generates an increase in the tax rate that is fairly small in comparison to the effect of 
hosting a cluster within the municipal boundaries (the effect is three times smaller). These 
results seem consistent with the findings of Rosenthal and Strange (2003), van Soest et al 
(2006), Viladecans-Marsal (2004) and Jofre-Monseny (2009) who found agglomeration 
economies to be highly localized. Notice that the market potential variable that we use is, in 
fact, total income in neighboring municipalities. The results of this exercise suggest that the 
small effect that we find for the market potential variable on the tax rate could be the result 
of the particular way in which we measure market potential. 
In our view, the fact that we measure agglomeration economies more than two 
decades before municipalities were able set different tax rates makes the validity of our 
instruments plausible. However, municipalities with high urbanization and localization 
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 economies might have higher expenditure needs, generating a spurious correlation between 
agglomeration economies’ variables and tax rates. Notice, though, that the inclusion of 
variables proxying for expenditure needs such as income, the share of unemployed or the 
share of immigrants does not alter the estimated effects of the agglomeration economies’ 
variables on the tax rate, suggesting that our results are not completely driven by the 
omission of unobserved expenditure needs. To address this concern further, we make use 
of the fact that the local business tax is not the only municipal tax in Spain. If the 
correlation between high tax rates and agglomeration economies were driven by 
unobserved expenditure needs, we would not expect this correlation to be specific to the 
local business tax. As a robustness exercise, we re-define the dependent variable to be a 
measure of the local property tax burden. Unlike the local business tax, the property tax is 
paid by both home and establishments owners and, therefore, seems less suitable as an 
instrument for taxing agglomeration economies. The local property tax bill is determined 
by the nominal tax rate times the assessed value of the property. The nominal tax rate is 
not very informative because re-assessments are infrequent and are not carried out 
simultaneously across municipalities25. We, therefore, measure the local property tax 
burden as the average property tax bill in the municipality (Tax revenue/Number of bills). 
We report the results of this exercise in table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The first column in Table 7 reports Tobit estimates of a specification in which the 
average property tax bill is regressed on the agglomeration economies’ variables and 
provincial and population size interval dummies. In the second column, we introduce the 
rest of control variables (income, left-wing government, share of population aged 0-14, 
share of population over 65, share of unemployed, share of immigrants and the share of 
disseminated population). Finally, we re-estimate this specification using the Two-Step 
Tobit estimator, where the urbanization and cluster variables are instrumented. Notice that 
the dependent variable is measured in € per capita and therefore the estimates cannot be 
directly compared to the results reported in the previous tables. In the most parsimonious 
specification, the results indicate that municipalities with higher urbanization economies 
and a higher market potential set higher local business tax rates. These effects, however, 
vanish almost completely in the specification that includes all the control variables (second 
column). When, additionally, we instrument the agglomeration economies’ variables (third 
                                                 
25 In 2002, 65% of municipalities in Spain had not re-assessed their property for the last 12 years. 
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 column), the estimates of interest are even smaller and none of them is statistically different 
from zero. The last specification (fourth column) additionally includes a third order 
polynomial of the number of years since the last property re-assessment took place in the 
municipality. The results remain largely unchanged. Overall, the results reported in table 7 
are reassuring, given that the agglomeration economies’ variables are not found to 
determine the property tax burden. Notice too, that there are substantial differences with 
respect to the variables that determine the business and property tax rate choices. While the 
political color of the government and the agglomeration economies’ variables are key 
determinants of the local business tax rate, the property tax rate seems to be determined by 
variables that affect the demand and the cost of providing public services such as the level 
of income, the share of elders, and the share of immigrants in the municipality. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 The aim of this paper is to empirically test whether the jurisdictions that host an 
agglomeration of firms tax their businesses more heavily, using municipal data from Spain. 
In order to shed light on the nature of the relationship between agglomeration economies 
and local business tax rates, we augment the DePater and Myers (1994) tax competition 
game with agglomeration economies. In the presence of agglomeration effects, capital 
locates disproportionally in the jurisdiction with higher agglomeration economies. Hence, 
the government with high agglomeration economies taxes businesses more heavily in order 
to export taxes to non-resident capital owners. We examine the municipal tax rates set in 
the Spanish municipal business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas) with a (cross-
section) sample of 2,772 municipalities in the year 2002. The main findings of the paper 
can be summarized as follows. Municipalities with high urbanization economies set higher 
tax rates. Municipalities that host a cluster of firms in an industry in which localization 
economies are important also set higher tax rates. We use an instrumental variables 
approach to address the fact that tax rates may determine the location of economic 
activities. As instruments, we use agglomeration economies’ variables measured in 1970, 
long before the decentralization of local business taxation in Spain in 1992. Although the 
evidence is much weaker, we also find that municipalities with a higher market potential set 
higher business tax rates. 
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       Table 1. Descriptive statistics for municipalities (# observations is 2,772). 
 Mean St. dev Max Min Source 
Taxes      
      Bussiness tax “rate”  1.223 0.245 1.9 0.8 a 
      Negative dist. to the max. tax “rate” -0.272 0.228 0.0 -0.9 a 
      Average property tax bill 121 99 2279 11 a 
Agglomeration economies      
      No. of employees (employees) 5,104 30,321 1,287,388 125 b 
      Cluster (1%) 0.019  1 0 b 
      Market potential neighbors (×103€) 2,379 7,819 42,000 0 c 
Controls      
      Left Government 0.50  1 0 d 
      Income 4.28 1.98 8 1 e 
      Population 0-14 (in %) 13.38 3.80 24.29 0.10 c 
      Population >65 (in %) 20.03 8.36 48.12 0.02 c 
      Unemployment rate (in %) 3.92 1.89 14.10 0.40 e 
      Share immigrants (in %) 3.73 5.13 55.70 0.00 c 
      Disseminated pop. (in %) 6.43 13.35 100.00 0.00 c 
       Notes: a denotes Spanish Ministry of Finance, b  National Institute of Statistics (Census 
       of establishments 2001), c Population and Housing Census 2001, d Spanish Ministry 
       of Domestic affairs and e Anuario Economico de España Yearbooks. 
 
 
   Table 2. Descriptive statistics for industry clusters. Number of clusters and minimum  
   and maximum employment levels defining cluster as a municipality that hosts a  
   minimum share of the industry employment. 
Industry employment threshold 0,1%  0,5%  1%  5%  
Industries 
# clusters 
(Min/Max) 
# clusters 
(Min/Max)
# clusters 
(Min/Max) 
# clusters 
(Min/Max)
Manufacture of  
Textiles (CNAE 17) 
153 
(87/5,526) 
30 
(432/5,526) 
11 
(874/5,526) 
4 
(4,511/5,526)
Manufacture of leather and leather 
products (CNAE 19) 
88 
(100/27,805) 
27 
(545/27,805)
15 
(1,029/27,805) 
3 
(6,559/27,805)
Publishing, printing and reproduction 
of recorded media (CNAE 22) 
139 
(198/27,292) 
33 
(989/27,292)
11 
(2,065/27,292) 
2 
(19,602/27,292)
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products (CNAE 26) 
181 
(158/8,789) 
21 
(816/8789) 
9 
(1,636/8,789) 
1 
(8,789/8,789)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers (CNAE 34) 
162 
(228/11,759) 
30 
(1128/11,759)
10 
(2,630/11,759) 
1 
(11,759/11,759)
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment (CNAE 35) 
130 
(61/4,026) 
35 
(323/4,026) 
19 
(621/4,026) 
2 
(3,061/4,026)
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               Table 3. Baseline results: The determinants of the business tax rate. 
 Tobit OLS 
Agglomeration economies    
0.033*** 0.031** 0.030***       Urbanization economies (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
0.062** 0.063** 0.059**       Cluster (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) 
0.003** 0.002* 0.002*       Market potential (neighbors) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls    
 0.043*** 0.033***      Left Government  (0.011) (0.009) 
 0.007 0.005       Income  (0.005) (0.004) 
 -0.001 -0.001       Population 0-14 (in %)  (0.002) (0.001) 
 0.001 0.001       Population >65 (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.008** 0.007**       Unemployment rate (in %)  (0.004) (0.003) 
 0.002 0.001       Share immigrants (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000       Disseminated  
      population (in %)  (0.001) (0.000) 
      Dummies for population 
      size intervals Yes Yes Yes 
      Provincial dummies (NUTS 3) Yes Yes Yes 
 # observations 2,772 2,772 2,772 
                Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes statistical significance at  
                the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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                Table 4. Instrumental Variables estimates: The determinants of the 
               business tax rate. 
 Two-Step Tobit 2SLS 
Agglomeration economies    
0.055** 0.055** 0.051***       Urbanization economies (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) 
0.183** 0.176** 0.154***       Cluster (0.072) (0.073) (0.055) 
0.003** 0.003* 0.002*       Market potential (neighbors) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls    
 0.043*** 0.033***      Left Government  (0.012) (0.009) 
 0.007 0.004       Income  (0.006) (0.004) 
 -0.001 -0.001       Population 0-14 (in %)  (0.002) (0.001) 
 0.002 0.002*       Population >65 (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.008** 0.007**       Unemployment rate (in %)  (0.004) (0.003) 
 0.002 0.002*       Share immigrants (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000       Disseminated  
      population (in %)  (0.001) (0.000) 
      Dummies for population 
      size intervals Yes Yes Yes 
      Provincial dummies (NUTS 3) Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage Results    
      Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat.   265[0.00] 
  # observations 2,731 2,731 2,731 
                Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes statistical significance at  
                the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. P-values within brackets. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks I. The determinants of the business tax rate. 
Defining cluster at different thresholds of the industry employment  
Two-Step Tobit 
 
 
0.1% 0.5% 1% 5% 
Agglomeration economies     
0.052** 0.049** 0.055** 0.059***       Urbanization economies (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
0.094 0.225** 0.176** 0.199*       Cluster (0.101) (0.089) (0.073) (0.106) 
0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*       Market potential (neighbors) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls     
0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043***      Left Government (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.006 0.009 0.007 0.006       Income (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002       Population 0-14 (in %) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002       Population >65 (in %) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.007* 0.007** 0.008** 0.008**       Unemployment rate (in %) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.001       Share immigrants (in %) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       Disseminated  
      population (in %) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      Dummies for population 
      size intervals Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Provincial dummies (NUTS 3) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  # observations 2,731 2,731 2,731 2,731 
                Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes statistical significance at  
                the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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               Table 6. Robustness checks II. The determinants of the business tax rate      
               accounting for agglomeration economies of neighbors. 
 Tobit Two-Step Tobit 
Agglomeration economies    
0.030*** 0.031** 0.058**       Urbanization economies (0.011) (0.012) (0.023) 
0.000 -0.000 -0.003       Neighbors urbanization economies  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
0.059* 0.061** 0.153**       Cluster (0.031) (0.031) (0.073) 
0.046** 0.042** 0.061**       Neighbors Cluster (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) 
0.002 0.001 0.003       Market potential (neighbors) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Controls    
 0.042*** 0.042***      Left Government  (0.011) (0.012) 
 0.004 0.003       Income  (0.005) (0.006) 
 -0.001 -0.001       Population 0-14 (in %)  (0.002) (0.002) 
 0.001 0.002       Population >65 (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.007** 0.007**       Unemployment rate (in %)  (0.004) (0.004) 
 0.002 0.002       Share immigrants (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 0.000 0.000       Disseminated  
      population (in %)  (0.001) (0.001) 
      Dummies for population 
      size intervals Yes Yes Yes 
      Provincial dummies (NUTS 3) Yes Yes Yes 
  # observations 2,772 2,772 2,731 
                Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes statistical significance at  
                the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Figures within brackets are  
                p-values. 
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        Table 7. Robustness checks III: The determinants of the property tax burden. 
 Tobit Two-Step Tobit 
Agglomeration economies     
27.095*** 7.753** 6.764 6.092       Urbanization economies (3.037) (3.285) (7.726) (7.539) 
-7.451 7.664 10.918 12.496       Cluster (9.483) (9.431) (18.423) (18.361) 
1.373*** 0.351 0.349 0.395       Market potential (neighbors) (0.345) (0.361) (0.401) (0.408) 
Controls     
 -5.270 -4.893 -5.179      Left Government  (3.445) (3.470) (3.476) 
 16.611*** 16.597*** 16.166***       Income  (1.293) (1.450) (1.469) 
 0.808 0.824 0.833       Population 0-14 (in %)  (0.512) (0.509) (0.508) 
 -1.179*** -1.234*** -1.170***       Population >65 (in %)  (0.236) (0.279) (0.283) 
 -1.396* -1.428* -1.336       Unemployment rate (in %)  (0.812) (0.848) (0.835) 
 1.262*** 1.234** 1.195**       Share immigrants (in %)  (0.489) (0.504) (0.501) 
 -0.162 -0.160 -0.192       Disseminated  
      population (in %)  (0.133) (0.135) (0.135) 
      Third order polynomial of years 
      since last re-assessment No No No Yes 
      Dummies for population 
      size intervals Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Provincial dummies (NUTS 3) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  # observations 2,772 2,772 2,731 2,731 
        Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%    
        level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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 Figure 1. Scatter plot of business tax rates vs. population in 2002. Legal maximum 
business tax rates jump at 5, 20, 50 and 100 thousand inhabitants. 
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 Annex 1. Tax competition with endogenous agglomeration economies. 
To examine this issue we write Ai as 
γ
ii KKHA == )( , reflecting that local productivity 
increases with the size of the local economy (localization economies and urbanization 
economies are conceptually equivalent in this model since there is only one sector). We 
assume that ααLKLKF −= 1),(  which implies that αγ iiii kLkx )(= . Notice that local 
productivity is not a function of the capital/labor ratio but depends on the overall capital 
level in the jurisdiction. This assumption is made in order to make productivity increase 
with size. This generates an agglomerative force in the model. In the absence of taxes, it 
must be the case that 11 sk >  if 2/11 >s , where )/( 2111 LLLs += . This implies that, in 
the absence of taxes, the large jurisdiction will import capital and the small jurisdiction will 
export capital. 
The marginal productivity of capital, MPK  differs from the private return to 
capital, i.e. )()( iii kfkAr ′= , by the value of the externality )()( ii kfkA′ . Hence, 
)()( ii kfkA′  constitutes a wedge between the return and the marginal productivity of 
capital. Assuming αγ iiii kLkx )(=  implies that the marginal productivity of capital and the 
private return of capital are proportional to each other26. Hence, the value of the 
externality, i.e. )()( ii kfkA′ , is also proportional to the private productivity of capital ir , 
implying that )()( ii kfkA′  is also a decreasing function of ik  given that 0<ii dk/dr , by 
assumption. Tax rates at the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game satisfy: 
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which implies that: 
 ( ) ( ) 0)()( =+′+−
i
i
iii
i
i dt
dktkfkA
dt
ρdkk         (A3) 
At the symmetric equilibrium neither jurisdiction imports or exports capital, implying that 
equation (A3) reduces to )()( iii kfkAt ′=− , i∀ . Hence, in the symmetric equilibrium 
both governments subsidize capital. Governments subsidize capital in equilibrium because 
                                                 
26 This condition guarantees that the no-tax decentralized equilibrium is efficient in the sense that it 
maximizes total output in the economy, the reason being that output maximizes when the marginal 
productivity of capital is equal across jurisdictions. 
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 of the existence of a wedge between the return and the marginal productivity of capital. 
Firms perceive the marginal productivity of capital to be )()( ii kfkA ′  whereas it is actually 
)()(')()( iiii kfkAkfkA +′ . Hence governments subsidize each unit of capital for the value 
of its external effect, i.e. )()(' ii kfkA . We now turn to the asymmetrical case. In general, 
(A3) implies that the capital exporting jurisdiction (i=E) subsidizes capital above the wedge 
between private and social marginal productivities, i.e. )()( EEi kfkAt ′>− . In turn, the 
capital importing jurisdiction (i= I) either taxes capital or subsidizes it below the wedge 
between private and social marginal productivities )()( IIi kfkAt ′<− . Given that 
)()( ii kfkA′  is a decreasing function of ki by assumption, the capital exporting jurisdiction 
subsidizes capital more than the capital importing jurisdiction, i.e. IE tt −>− . The reason is 
that the value of the external effect, )()( ii kfkA′ , will be higher for the tax exporting 
jurisdiction since EI kk >( ). Hence, the following sequence of inequalities holds. 
exportersubsidy )()()()( importertax)(or subsidy ≡−<′<′<−≡ EEEIII tkfkAkfkAt  
Under tax competition and endogenous production externalities, the large 
jurisdiction will import capital and the small jurisdiction will export it. To see this, assume 
that jurisdiction 2, the small jurisdiction, wants to become a capital importer. This is only 
possible if 0)( 21 >>− tt  such that 12 kk >  in equilibrium (if 021 =− tt  then the 
jurisdiction 2 exports capital). However, being a capital importing jurisdiction implies 
subsidizing capital less than the capital exporting jurisdiction, that is, 0)( 12 >− tt , which 
contradicts 0)( 21 >− tt . Hence, the small jurisdiction cannot import capital.  Hence, under 
tax competition, the jurisdiction with a larger endowment of the fixed factor sets a higher 
tax rate while keeping higher capital intensity. Hence, tax competition reduces the gap in 
capital intensities but does not eliminate it. 
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